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Abstract:The network effect is the general principle

extreme, a market characterized by network effects is

that the value of connecting to a network depends on

usually expected to be taken by a monopoly [7] [10]

the number of existing customers in the network.

[12]. Network effect has been influential in the com-

Usually, the network effect makes strong firms

petition between technological standards in network

stronger and weak firms weaker. In e-commerce,

industries, such as information, telecommunication

however, the power of network effects can be miti-

and consumer electronics industries [20]. Well-known

gated when users adopt multiple transaction platforms

examples include the war between Wintel and Apple

(i.e., multiple adoption). Owing to multiple adoption,

computers (Wintel is a dominant market leader and

emerging firms have a chance to compete with or

Apple is a niche player), the war of VHS and Beta

surpass strong incumbents. This empirical study

video recorders (VHS succeeded and Beta failed), and

showed that, because of multiple adoption, smaller

recently the war between blue-ray DVD and HD DVD

players can still exist in the face of a dominant player

(blue-ray DVD is now dominating).

in China’s competitive online auction platforms.

The impact of network effect still carries over to

Keywords: Network effect, e-commerce, multiple

electronic commerce [16]. In electronic commerce,

adoption, online auction.

the first-mover advantage chiefly comes from network effect, and this is especially true for the in-

1. Introduction

fo-mediary business such as online auctions and on-

In network economics, network effect refers to the

line recruiting services. With more buyers and sellers

general principle that the value in connecting to a

(or employers and applicants), the website offers

network increases with the number of users already in

more chances of successful transactions (or employ-

the network. The networks can be physical, such as

ments). Thus the value of participating in a larger

telephone networks, or virtual, such as the networks of

auction (recruitment) website is higher, and users

the members of a Web site or the networks of the users

tend to prefer larger sites to smaller ones, which

of a computer system. Because of network effect,

makes larger sites even larger. Empirical evidences

larger networks are more valuable to users than

include the competitions between eBay and Ya-

smaller ones. Users thus tend to prefer larger networks

hoo!Auction in North America (where eBay is the

to smaller ones, which makes larger networks even

winner) and in Japan (where Yahoo!Auction beats

larger. This self-reinforcement nature makes the strong

eBay).

firms stronger and the weak firms weaker. To an

Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists
between e-commerce and other network industries:
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multiple adoption of products or services. In informa-
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tion or telecommunication industries, the cost can be

utility a user derives from consumption increases with

prohibitively high for general consumers to buy one

the number of other users consuming the good. Later

Apple computer and one Wintel computer, or sub-

on, Choi et al. [2] argued that network externality is no

scribe simultaneously to two or more cell phone ser-

longer an externality if a market price already reflects

vices. Therefore, users are forced to take exclusive

the price of an external benefit or loss, and proposed

adoption by participating in just one network. In

that the term network effects can better describe the

e-commerce, however, the cost can be sufficiently

targeted phenomenon than network externality. This

low to allow users to adopt two or more networks.

study adopts this suggestion and uses network effects

For general users, the cost is merely applying for an

to describe the phenomenon.

account in multiple websites. We term this phenomenon as multiple adoption.

Recent works on network effects examined numerous topics, including product launch strategies

In e-commerce, therefore, the winner may not

[11], pricing strategies [5], innovation and strategic

always take all the market and challengers can still

activities[4] [5], the customer-capturing strategy for

have a chance to survive and grow. For example,

replacing leading technologies [13], and compatibility

Yahoo!Kimo Auction is the leading auction site in

strategies [20]. Some researchers extended the theory

Taiwan, but the new entrant ruten.com competes

of network effects to two-sided markets such as auc-

with Yahoo!Kimo Auction and survives [17]. In ad-

tions and recruiting services [1] [8] [9].

dition, most users of ruten.com are multiple adopters

Unfortunately, previous works were mostly

who adopt both Yahoo!Kimo Auction and ru-

based on the simple assumption that consumers adopt

ten.com simultaneously [18]. Since C2C platforms

one network at a time. In reality, however, users may

are one of the major online purchasing channels [19]

adopt more than one network simultaneously. We

and the size of C2C electronic market in China is

termed this phenomenon as multiple adoption [14]

much larger than that in Taiwan, it is interesting to

[15]. Some other researchers introduced similar terms

examine whether and how multiple adoption occurred

such as multihoming [3] to describe this situation,

in China.

and discussed various strategies in the context of

In this study, we examine the market situation of

multiple adoption. However, these works are mostly

C2C auction sites in China, and explore the following

theoretical models in economics rather than extensive

questions:

empirical studies. The purposes of this paper are

(1) Whether multiple adoption occurs (i.e., users

therefore: (1) providing empirical evidence for mul-

adopt multiple auction sites simultaneously)?

tiple adoption to enhance the theoretical research

(2) Why and why not users adopt multiple auction

models, and (2) providing information and sugges-

sites?
(3) Is multiple adoption an intermediate phase to

tions for challengers to take advantage of multiple
adoption for survival and growth.

exclusive adoption?

3. Background and Methodology
2. Literature Review

Established in 1999, Eachnet was China’s earliest and

There is a rich literature on network effects. For ex-

largest C2C auction site. In 2002, eBay partnered with

ample, Katz and Shapiro [7] proposed the term posi-

Eachnet to establish eBayEachnet, but soon faced

tive consumption externality and defined it as the

tough competition from China’s local start-up Taobao,
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which was set up in 2003. In 2006, Taobao surpassed

4.1 Sample Profile

eBayEachnet and become China’s largest C2C plat-

Table 1 shows the sample profile. Of the 170

form. In 2009, eBayEachnet exited from China’s C2C

samples, 116 (68.2%) are female and 54 (32.8%) are

market and transformed into a service company for the

male. Their ages are mostly between 21 and 30

purchase of oversees products. Currently, Taobao is

(66.5%) or under (including) 20 (32.3%). Almost all

the largest C2C auction site in China, followed by

of them (169 out of 170) have collegiate degrees or

PaiPai, which was established in 2006.

higher. Most of them (162 or 95.3%) are students.

The questionnaire was designed to understand

Most of them (130 or 76.5%) have experience in on-

how users adopt the two major auction sites in China
－ Taobao and PaiPai, with special emphasis on

line auctions for one year or more. There are 163

whether and how users have multiple adoption. Be-

(0.6%) pure seller, and one bystander (browsing on-

cause auction is a two-sided market connecting buy-

ly).

(95.9%) pure buyers, 5 (2.9%) mixed users, one

ers and sellers, the questionnaire deliberately identified three types of users: pure buyers, pure sellers,

4.2 Adoption of Auction Websites

and mixed users (i.e., buyer and sellers). The ques-

Of the 170 samples, 158 (92.9%) adopted Taobao

tionnaire was proofread by 5 graduate students who

exclusively, 1 (0.6%) adopted PaiPai exclusively, and

were savvy users of online auction websites, and a

11 (6.5%) adopted both websites. Moreover, all 11

pretest was then conducted for further correction and

multiple adopters are pure buyers, and all joined

modification. After this, the printed questionnaire was

Taobao first and then PaiPai, which means that PaiPai

disseminated in five classes, one is MBA students and

is starting to erode the business of Taobao. However,

the others are undergraduate students, all of them are

this also means that most customers of PaiPai are not

students at a university in China. A total of 170 valid

new (distinct) consumers. Rather, they are multiple

responses were collected.

adopters coming from the rival auction website Taobao. This implies that for new entrant firms such as

4. Data Analysis

PaiPai, attracting multiple adopters may be an impor-

We distinguish and categorize users by two dimen-

tant marketing strategy.

sions: activities in auctions websites and memberships
in auction websites.

4.3 Why and Why Not Multiple Adoption

According to chief activities, there are three

As shown in Table 2, the three main reasons for mul-

kinds of users: (1) pure buyers: buying goods without

tiple adoption, in order, are: (1) looking for more

selling goods; (2) pure sellers: selling goods without

transactions, (2) seeking special goods, and (3)

buying goods; (3) mixed users: buying goods and

searching for more information about products and

selling goods. For ease of discussion, pure buyers and

prices.

pure sellers are collectively termed as pure users.

Note the order of the reasons reverses the find-

According to membership, there are two kinds of

ing in Taiwan [18]. This may reflect that buyers in

users: (1) exclusive adopters: using either Taobao or

China’s are more active or aggressive in purchasing

PaiPai, but not both; (2) multiple adopters: using

than Taiwan’s buyers, supporting the fact that C2C

both Taobao and PaiPai.

market in China is growing drastically and more
competitive.
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As shown in Table 3, for the 158 exclusive

established trading partners (14.6%). Note that the

adopters using only Taobao, the chief reasons for not

first and the third reasons are the lock-in effect [10]

adopting multiple auction sites are: (1) having been

and the second reason is a case of the network effect.

used to the interface of Taobao (39.9%), (2) there are

Clearly, Taobao has obtained first-mover advantage

more members in Taobao (30%), and (3) they have

relative to PaiPai.

Table1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Study Participants
Count
Gender
Male
54
Female
116
Age
 20 (years)
55
21 ≦ age ＜ 30
113
≥ 30
2
Job
Student
162
Teacher
4
Others
4
Online auction experience
< 1 year
40
≥ 1 yr and < 3 yrs
96
≥ 3 yrs
34
Chief activities
Pure buyer
163
Pure seller
1
Buyer and seller
5
Others
1

%
32.8
68.2
32.3
66.5
1.2
95.3
2.4
2.4
23.5
56.5
20.0
95.9
0.6
2.9
0.6

Table 2. Reasons for Multiple Adoption
Reason

Frequency

%

looking for more transactions
seeking special goods

5
3

45.5%
27.3%

searching for more information about products and prices

2

18.2%

others

1

9.1%

Table 3. Reasons for Not Multiple Adoption
Reason

Frequency

%

having been used to the interface of Taobao

63

39.9%

more members in Taobao

59

37.3%

with established trading partners
others

23
13

14.6%
8.2%

4.4 Multiple Adoption as a Transition Phase to
Exclusive Adoption

For the 158 exclusive users of Taobao, we further investigated whether they ever used eBayEach-
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Net, and if yes, how they become exclusive users of

fore, they must find ways to attract a significant

Taobao. Of the 158 users, 14 of them ever used

number of web users to visit their sites to gain more

eBayEachNet. Five of these 14 users adopted

bargaining power with advertisers.

eBayEachNet initially, then adopted both BayEach-

5. It is important to note that although users can

Net and Taobao (i.e., multiple adoption), and finally

gain benefits (such as gathering more information,

only Taobao. Four of these 14 users adopted Taobao

finding more items, achieving more transactions)

initially, then both BayEachNet and Taobao (i.e.,

from multiple adoption, they have to pay costs (such

multiple adoption), and finally only Taobao. Five of

as time cost, energy cost, and/or money) for multiple

these 14 users adopted eBayEachNet initially, and

adoption. New entrant firms, therefore, should not

then directly switched to Taobao exclusively. From

only find ways to provide more benefits to multiple

this fact, we see that multiple adoption can serve as a

adopters but also reduce their costs of multiple adop-

transition phase to exclusive adoption.

tion so that multiple adopters will gain net profit in
multiple adoption.

5. Discussion

6. To reduce uncertainly and risks, users may not

From the above analysis, we have the following ob-

wish to abandon original supplier all at once to switch

servations:

to a new supplier. Rather, users may adopt both orig-

1. Network effects can result in first-mover ad-

inal supplier and new supplier for some time, where

vantage for incumbents. Therefore, the get-big-fast

multiple adoption occurs. Therefore, new suppliers

strategy must be pursued to build a larger customer

may facilitate or encourage multiple adoption for us-

base. Meanwhile, consumers’ multiple adoption of

ers as a less risky transition phase toward exclusively

online services still gives starting firms a chance to

adopting new suppliers.

survive and even surpass incumbent firms.
2. Consumers are variety seekers, ready to have

6. Conclusion

novel experiences, and eager for more information to

In this paper, we conducted an empirical study on the

reduce uncertainties and ensure fairness in trade. A

behavior of online auction users to understand how

single dominant player in online business is not fully

network effects and multiple adoption interact to in-

favorable to consumers, and consumers are welcom-

fluence the competition between the two major auc-

ing new firms to enter the market.

tion websites in China. We also examined whether

3. New entrant firms can attract customers if
they can provide valuable information, special goods,
and facilitate transaction processes.

multiple adoption could be a transition phase to exclusive adoption.
We found that a larger customer base can result

4. The revenue of online auction websites comes

in stronger network effects and gives the incumbent

from several sources, such as selling advertisements,

the competitive advantage, but users still adopt mul-

transaction fees, product registration fees, and mem-

tiple auction websites, giving smaller firms a chance

bership fees. For stronger firms, charging fees for

to thrive.

membership or transaction may be acceptable to most
customers, although this may lose some business to

Here are suggestions for both the incumbent and
starting firms in electronic commerce:

competitors. For startup firms, the revenue should

(1) The incumbent firm (market leader) should

chiefly come from selling advertisements, and there-

seek ways that add more value to the current con-
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Economics, 2003, 34(2), 309-328.

more customers are retained, the network effects will

[2] Choi, S.-Y., Stahl, D. O., & Whinston, A. B. “Is

be stronger and the incumbent will enjoy more com-

Microsoft a monopolist?” Brazilian Electronic

petitive advantage.

Journal of Economics, 1997, 1.

(2) The starting firm, on the other hand, should

[3] Doganoglu, T. & Wright, J. “Multihoming and

seek ways that encourage consumers to take multiple

compatibility,” International Journal of Indus-

adoption to attract customers from the market leader.

trial Organization, 2006, 24(1), 45-67.

In addition, multiple adoption may also occur in

[4] Ehrhardt, M. “Network effects, standardization

other online platforms such as job websites and on-

and competitive strategy: how companies influ-

line gaming [21]. For example, an employer (or job

ence the emergence of dominant designs,” In-

seeker) may adopt more than one job website to post

ternational Journal of Technology Management,

job openings (or to find jobs). The findings in this

2004, 27(2-3), 272-294.

paper may also offer some insights in these online
industries.

[5] Ende, J. & Wijnberg, N. “The organization of

innovation and market dynamics: managing in-

For other technology-based services, multiple

creasing returns in software firms,” IEEE

adoption may serve as a transition phase from exist-

Transactions on Engineering Management, 2003,

ing technologies to new technologies. That is, before

50(3), 374-382.

completely replacing existing technologies, new

[6] Gallaugher, J. M. & Wang, Y.-M. “Understanding

technological facilities may co-exist with existing

network effects in software markets: evidence

technological facilities to reduce the anxieties or risks

from web server pricing,” MIS Quarterly, 2002,

in using new technologies. For example, when intro-

26(4), 303-327.

ducing the emerging NFC (near field communication)

[7] Katz, M. L. & Shapiro, C. “Network externalities,

services such as contacless smart cards or contactless

competition, and compatibility,” American Eco-

payment, service providers should allow users to use

nomic Review, 1985, 75(3), 424-440.

either NFC-enabled smart phones or traditional cards.

[8] Parker, G. G. & Van Alstyne, M. W. “Two-sided

This would make the transition from existing tech-

network effects: a theory of information product

nologies to new technologies smoother.

design,” Management Science, 2005, 51(10),

Overall, this empirical study made a confirma-

1494-1504.

tion to the theoretical frameworks of Teng et al. [14]

[9] Rochet, J. C. & Tirole, J. “Platform competition

and Doganoglu and Wright [3] on multiple adoption.

in two-sided markets,” Journal of European

Future theoretical research can be conducted to refine

Economics Association, 2003, 1(4), 990-1029.

and extend theoretical models based on the evidence
provided by this paper, and future empirical research
can be conducted to find more detailed profiles of
multiple adopters.

[10] Shapiro, C. & Varian, H. R. Information Rules,

HBS Press, 1998.
[11] Sun, B., Xie, J., & Cao, H. H. “Product strategy

for innovators in markets with network effects,”
Marketing Science, 2004, 23(2), 243-254.
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